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CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT THAT BIG CORPORATIONS SHOULD HAVE
BUT Do NOT WANT
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
The most controversial Supreme Court decision of the 2009-
2010 Supreme Court Term was, without question, Citizens United
v. FEC.' The decision has captured the public imagination both
for the question it asked and the answer it gave. In an age of
much sharp political division and much incipient populism, it is
easy to raise emotional flags by asking the question of whether
corporations have the same rights as ordinary citizens. And it is
easy for emotional involvement to turn to intense distaste in the
aftermath of a decision that it is commonly thought to represent
a great triumph of the conservative wing of the Court. All too
many commentators, from President Barack Obama on down,
have voiced their displeasure at a decision that handed corpo-
rate interests a powerful tool by which they can dominate the
political arena at the expense of ordinary citizens.
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Pe-
ter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; Senior Lecturer,
The University of Chicago. This paper is a modified version of the inaugural lec-
ture for the Laurence A. Tisch Professorship, delivered at New York University on
September 27, 2010. It is my very great honor to have been appointed the Laur-
ence A. Tisch Professor of Law at New York University, and to have this opportu-
nity to express my thanks to Alice and Tom Tisch who created this position in
honor of his distinguished father, and to Ricky Revesz who orchestrated this ap-
pointment with his inexorable decanal logic. My thanks to Brett Davenport,
Maxine Sharavsky, and Christopher Tan for their usual excellent research assis-
tance. On the personal side, I have to thank my wife, Eileen, and my children,
Melissa, Benjamin, and Elliot for all the personal support that they have extended
over the years-subject to the caveat that they are not to be held responsible for
anything that I said in my lecture or on any other occasion.
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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Or so much of the conventional wisdom goes. In this Article, I
examine the many questions that swirl around Citizens United to
expose the fundamental errors of its many critics. My interest in
so doing does not depend on any affection for or hostility to cor-
porate interests. Rather I was drawn to address this case because
it requires us to pull together law from a number of different
areas to create a coherent analysis of the constitutionality of the
statutorily created system in question. Through the course of
this Article, I will explore the justifications for the Court's deci-
sion in Citizens United from both constitutional and pragmatic
perspectives. On the former question, I conclude that the major-
ity has much the better of the issue insofar as it seeks to fold is-
sues of corporate speech into the general fabric of First
Amendment law. On the latter, I conclude that from a pragmatic
point of view most corporations have little desire to exercise the
constitutional rights which they receive, and this for the simplest
of reasons. Over a broad range of issues, business success de-
pends on keeping a low profile in general elections. Corpora-
tions do far better to concentrate their energies on specific issues
of concern to them. They become sitting ducks to the extent they
choose to enter any broader political arena.
I. CITIZENS UNITED IN CONTEXT
Citizens United addressed the question of whether a corpora-
tion or a union may use general treasury funds (free of complex
regulatory restrictions) to pay for electioneering communica-
tions immediately before an election, 2 (when the communica-
tions are likely to be the most salient). The Court in Citizens
United invalidated the portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002 (BCRA)3 that limited such spending.4 The
BCRA, more than perhaps any other statute, requires some pre-
dictive assessment to determine how this complex Act, if it had
remained effective in its entirety, would have influenced the
conduct of our political campaigns. In addition, the case came
before the Court at the beginning of 2010, when the economic
fortunes of a nation were uncertain at best. Recriminations have
2. Id. at 880-81.
3. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28,
36, and 47 U.S.C.).
4. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
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alternately laid fault for these economic woes with big business,
excessive government, or some complex interaction of the two.
5
The case thus ties into the genuine struggle between the populist
and market sentiments that have become ever more polarized in
recent years. The BCRA has generated an enormous amount of
controversy, and Citizens United clearly counts as one of the most
divisive decisions of the Court in recent years.
The case did not arise in a void. Citizens United overturned
portions of the earlier case of McConnell v. FEC,6 which had fol-
lowed Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.7 In McCon-
nell, decided some seven years before Citizens United, Justices
Stevens and O'Connor tapped into a strong strand of progres-
sive populism when they upheld the same provisions of the
BCRA. In a tribute to New York University (NYU), they noted
that the great progressive thinker Elihu Root, NYU Class of
1867, had rightly said that corporate money and politics do not
mix,8 and that some effort to separate the two to reduce the ef-
fect of the former on the latter was an appropriate way to ana-
lyze the overall matter.
The Court's approach in McConnell is far from my own.9 The
question for this Article is how to deal with that decision from
both a constitutional and pragmatic approach. On both these
issues, I remain consistent with the intellectual temperament I
developed from the time I left law school in 1968, which was to
take comfort that the opinions I expressed were generally out
of step with the dominant mode of thought. That was a tactic
that I brought with me to the University of Chicago Law School
after I left the University of Southern California Law School.
And it is one that I happily bring with me to NYU now that I
have found a new home at this next stage of my career.
5. See, e.g., Arnold King, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure? 33
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 507, 507-08 (2010); Steven Moore & Tyler Grim, Straw Man
Capitalism and a New Path to Prosperity, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475,477 (2010).
6. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
7. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
8. See 540 U.S. at 115.
9. For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, McConnell v. Federal Election Com-
mission: A Deadly Dose of Double Deference, 3 ELECTION L.J. 231 (2004).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
An analysis of Citizens United is best conducted as a first ap-
proximation, disregarding the dominant heat of the day. I take
no position, therefore, on whether President Barack Obama or
Justice Samuel Alito misbehaved when the President lashed
out at the decision during his State of the Union Address.10 To
put the matter in a calmer perspective, it is useful to indicate
what the BCRA did, so that the constitutional and economic
analysis can take place in an orderly fashion. The key injunc-
tion at issue was this: no corporation or union may make an
expenditure on an "electioneering communication" within
thirty days of a primary or within sixty days of a general elec-
tion.11 Communications of all sorts before that time, when they
are likely to be less potent, were permissible. Likewise, com-
munications within that period that did not meet the statutory
definitions for exclusions also were allowable.1 2 But guess
wrong and a felony conviction with serious sanctions awaited
the overeager election campaigner. The question for constitu-
tional law is whether this provision may be justified under the
First Amendment's prohibition against restricting free speech:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .. . Like all provisions, length is in-
versely related to difficulties of interpretation and application
that arise thereafter. The question is how to address the con-
ceptual and economic issues that this provision raises.
Let us start with a few fundamentals of constitutional inter-
pretation. The first is that the text is the place to start, but it is
rarely possible to end there. In this context, there is much fuss
about the meaning of the term "speech" and the role that "free-
dom" plays in defining the scope of the applicable protection.
On the former question, speech clearly means "speech plus." It
10. See generally Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Na-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com
2010/01/29/us/politics/29scotus.html.
11. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (defining electioneering communication
as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which... refers to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office ... made within 60 days before a gen-
eral.., election... or 30 days before a primary or preference election").
12. But see FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (excepting genuine
issue advertisements from the BCRA's preelection blackout period).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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would be odd to say that you can speak at will, but that you are
subject to criminal sanctions if you read aloud from a written
text whose publication in written form is not protected by the
First Amendment. No one on either side of this debate thinks
that Hillary: The Movie, which Citizens United wanted to broad-
cast within thirty days of the Democratic primary, is not pro-
tected solely because it is a movie. The move from speech to
expression in the standard accounts is an effort to plug this ob-
vious gap in the system of constitutional protection.
So electioneering communications surely constitute speech.
But what kind of speech? Again, there is really no dispute about
this particular issue. It is political speech which, in most circum-
stances, falls within the core of maximally protected speech un-
der Supreme Court decisions. 14 These decisions hold that speech
or expression in the Constitution should have something to do
with the ability of individuals to engage in constructive (or divi-
sive) controversy about the behavior of government officials,
and the laws that these officials either pass or enforce.'i Citizens
United is not a case involving obscenity, libel, fraud, "fighting"
words, or any of the other categories of "low speech" that do not
garner the same speech-protective response from the Supreme
Court. 6 Hillary: The Movie is not even commercial speech;17
even though the original plans called for the movie to be dis-
tributed on cable video-on-demand television, it is surely not
some advertisement to buy or sell some particular product.
At this point, the constitutional inquiry turns to the issue of
justification, which is the other half of the matched pair for free-
dom. Within the clagsical view of constitutional law, all of these
issues were raised in connection with the police power, or the
state's ability to deal with matters of health, safety, general wel-
fare, or morals. Here we can quickly exhaust the obvious justifi-
cations that might be invoked to regulate other forms of speech,
because there was no allegation in this case that the movie was
in some sense fraudulent or defamatory. Indeed, it is worth not-
14. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)
("When a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we
uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state
interest.").
15. Id.
16. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
17. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Sev. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
557 (1980) (discussing the protection given to commercial speech by the Court).
643
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ing that even if the film were fraudulent or defamatory, our
jurisprudence clearly indicates that no court could enjoin the
publication of a libel.18 This line of decisions gives rise to the
obvious question of why it becomes possible to block, through
administrative processes, those kinds of publications that could
never be censored by a court of equity. Even damage actions
would be problematic because of the actual malice rule that
prohibits suits for false statement about a public figure, even if
done with negligence or gross negligence. 19 The puzzle thus
remains: Why the heavy sanctions here when the ordinary
processes of common law dictate quite different results?
It is equally clear that the speech at issue in Citizens United does
not involve cartel or monopoly practices,2 or abuse of children,21
or any of the other traditional exceptions to First Amendment
protection that are widely accepted precisely because they mirror
some classical liberal point of view that shaped the common law.
We can also remove complex issues that arise when the govern-
ment seeks to regulate the ability of its employees, either civilian
or military,22 to speak their minds. These rules are similar to those
that private employers can impose on their workers. Thus, as a
matter of principle, it seems clear that the government must also
have some proprietary perch that gives it powers above and be-
yond those that are available to it when it acts only as a regulator
and not as a manager.
Having reviewed this catalogue, it is evident that the kinds
of justifications that have to be put forward here are those that
are distinctive to political campaigns. It should be equally clear
that we have to evaluate those justifications not in isolation, but
by their incremental effect: How much benefit do we get from
these rules in light of the many prohibitions that are already in
18. See, e.g., Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 1967) ("[An injunction
will not issue to restrain torts, such as defamation or harassment .... ).
19. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) ("The constitu-
tional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official con-
duct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'.....); see
also Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S, 46 (1988) (extending Sullivan to
public figures).
20. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 (1993).
21. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
22. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (rights of members of mili-
tary); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (rights of fed-
eral government employees).
[Vol. 34644
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place, including those that prevent outright bribes to public
officials, and even more broadly, contributions that various in-
dividuals or entities can (or cannot) make to government offi-
cials and candidates for public office? The constitutionality of
these prohibitions was not an issue in Citizens United. How-
ever, the basic claim against the provision in Citizens United is
that given that it becomes harder to justify additional unprece-
dented restrictions when so many other restrictions are already
in place. The variations that surfaced both in this litigation and
in the many cases on the topic that preceded it are of two sorts.
The first class is largely conceptual, and depends on the unique
status of corporations as legal persons under American law.
The second class is largely functional, and posits serious dislo-
cations to the public discourse and political process if corporate
electioneering speech can take place with impunity.
The great irony is this: On the first point, the correct response
is that the proponents of BCRA fail woefully to find a powerful
justification of limiting these core forms of political speech. On
the second point, it seems clear that big corporations that sell to
large consumer markets will take little comfort in a decision
that exposes them to serious political risk, while affording
them few sensible ways to improve their own political position,
which is better achieved by steering clear of public expressions
of opinion in election campaigns. The bottom line is that big
corporations have little interest in exercising the constitutional
right that others have worked so hard to provide them.
III. SOME FANCY, AND FANCIFUL, CONCEPTUAL
JUSTIFICATIONS: CORPORATIONS AS LEGAL
PERSONS UNDER AMERICAN LAW
Justice Stevens's dissent in Citizens United relied heavily on
the Court's earlier decision in Austin, which sustained a Michi-
gan statute that subjected corporations, but not unions, to re-
strictions on the kinds of general expenditures that they could
make on election campaigns. 23 Much of this argument goes to
whether corporations should have any legal rights at all under
the First Amendment. In Citizens United, Justice Stevens's dis-
sent picked up on this strand by noting that corporations are
23. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929-79 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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not citizens and cannot vote.24 But the same is true of churches,
boy's clubs, and fraternal organizations. I would not know how
to extend the concept of a citizen to such an entity even if I
thought it was a good idea. And I certainly would not want to
let corporations vote, given that individuals can set up multiple
corporations at the drop of a hat.
However, those restrictions do not mean that corporations
are incapable of speech or should have no right to participate at
all in the political process. Nonetheless, that exact argument is
made by Justice Stevens, and subsequently by Professor Ronald
Dworkin,25 on the ground that corporations are fictitious enti-
ties that are created by the state. This view is a very dangerous
way to approach the subject, because it strikes at the heart of
the freedom of all the individuals who have decided to join to-
gether to form a corporation instead of, perhaps, an unincorpo-
rated association or limited partnership.
Let us examine one notable example of the risks of keeping
corporations strictly subservient to the states. Around the turn
of the last century, the State of Kentucky successfully used its
power over the incorporation of universities to require Berea
College to educate its white and black students on separate
campuses some twenty-five miles apart.26 After all, the argu-
ment went, if Kentucky could withhold the permission to in-
corporate absolutely, then it could do so with conditions.
Indeed, it was just that argument of state power that prevailed
in a decision by Justice David Josiah Brewer,27 over a powerful
dissent by Justice John Marshall Harlan, who had dissented
passionately in Plessy v. Ferguson.28
Justice Brewer's logic, as it applies to both Berea College and
Citizens United, suggests that the forfeiture of political speech is
the offset for getting the distinctive benefits of limited liability
and incorporation.29 This argument is pressed in two different
24. Id. at 930.
25. See Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
May 13, 2010, at 63, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/
may/13/decision-threatens-democracy/.
26. See An Act to Prohibit White and Colored Persons from Attending the Same
School, 1904 Ky. Acts 181, cited in Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 59 (1908)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
27. See Berea Coll., 211 U.S. at 54.
28. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. Berea Coil., 211 U.S. at 54 (majority opinion).
[Vol. 34
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ways. The first is to treat incorporation as a bargain between
the corporation and the government. We can give or withhold
the charter at will. We can, therefore, give it to you only if you
butt out of political activities. This logic has a potent applica-
tion in the instant case because it would allow Congress to neu-
ter all corporate speech, even speech unrelated to the election
of a candidate, and regardless of the speech's timing. There is,
on this view, no limiting principle on the use of state power.
Indeed, the State of New York or the next Republican admini-
stration in Washington, D.C., could argue that the New York
Times could not publish editorials so long as it chose to operate
in the corporate form-an unwise social move no matter what
one thinks of that paper's substantive positions.
There is something deeply wrong with this approach, and it
is crystallized in the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,3
one of the most ubiquitous, and yet most easily overlooked,
principles of constitutional law. According to this doctrine,
even if Congress can either prohibit or allow an activity, it can-
not coerce, induce, or pressure a party to waive its constitu-
tional rights in exchange for the privilege of engaging in the
activity.31 The same doctrine applies to limited liability for cor-
porations. Undoubtedly, Congress could condition a corpora-
tion's ability to gain limited liability on its willingness to take
out insurance against accidents caused by its employees during
the course of business. However, it could not condition the lim-
ited liability grant on the company's willingness to waive pro-
tection against searches and seizures, or any free speech rights
generally. 32 The great virtue of limited liability is that it protects
investors from the exposure to liability risks that existed under
partnership law. Because investors are free from fear that their
contribution to the corporation exposes them to potential loss
of private wealth, limited liability corporations can amass great
wealth from individual investors. But it is a very different mat-
ter to assert that the decision to take advantage of limited liabil-
ity forces individuals who incorporate to suffer restrictions on
their speech that would be unconstitutional if imposed on them
in their individual capacities. It seems beyond reason to say
30. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term-Foreword: Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1988).
31. Id. at 7.
32. See id.
647
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that the choice of a business form -association versus corpora-
tion-that is made for liability or tax reasons should have a
significant effect on the wholly unrelated issue of political par-
ticipation. All of these business forms are close substitutes for
each other. Therefore, it is sensible for the law to govern them
under a uniform regime regulating political speech, both as a
matter of statutory and constitutional law.
This particular view of the world is not altered by Justice Ste-
vens's observation that corporations were disfavored at the time
of the Framing.33 Surely on this point Justice Scalia is correct
when he insists that the protection of freedom of speech covers
the right to speak in association with other individuals, or even
to back up their efforts with support in either cash or kind.34 The
concept of a marketplace of ideas is that of a competitive market,
which in this context means one of free entry, by any and all by
whatever strategies or devices that they choose. A ban on speech
by aliens in newspapers would not withstand constitutional
muster, I believe, even if it were attached to visas upon admis-
sion to the country. Justice Stevens's remarks show that there
was due animus toward corporations that received special char-
ters, which gave them a huge competitive advantage over unin-
corporated bodies that did not have this advantage in raising
capital at the time of the Framing. Clearly, some alterations had
to be made to accommodate corporations, including allowing
them to be treated as citizens for the purpose of diversity juris-
diction. The animosity toward these corporations was cured by
the liberalization of the rules on incorporation toward the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, but not by creating further obsta-
cles to the use of the corporate form. 35
The second half of this argument is that the position of a
corporation is quite different from that of a labor union. This
issue was critical to the decision in Austin because unions
were not subject to the same limitations as corporations.3 6 In
one sense, the argument drops out in Citizens United, where
33. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949-50 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
34. Id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tihe individual person's right to speak in-
cludes the right to speak in association with other individuals. Surely the dissent
does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party can
be censored because it is not the speech of 'an individual American."').
35. See W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2 (rev. ed. 2006).
36. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665-66 (1990).
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the legislation was more even-handed between these two in-
stitutional rivals. However, once the issue of the statute's ef-
fect on the two groups is raised, it is worth noting that in
Austin Justice Marshall deftly rejected a quasi-Equal Protec-
tion challenge on two grounds. First, corporations had limited
liability (a benefit that unions did not have), and second, dis-
senting workers could opt out of political contributions in ex-
ercise of their First Amendment rights, although corporate
dissenters were bound to go along.37
Unfortunately, Justice Marshall offered a highly selective ac-
count of the differences between the two types of organiza-
tions, for unions have many advantages that corporations lack.
Those dissenting shareholders, for example, may be bound by
the decision, but they also can bring derivative actions on be-
half of the corporation and sell their shares, pummeling the
firm. These remedies matter a good deal for the shareholder
who sells shares for cash; in contrast, the employee who resigns
from a union cannot sell his position to the next union member.
Moreover, unions get enormous privileges under the Clayton
Act 38 that exempt many of their activities from the antitrust
laws. Unions also have the special protection of the Railway
Labor Act 39 and the National Labor Relations Act4° on key is-
sues related to campaigning and collective bargaining, which
have to be added into the mix. The balance of advantages to
corporations or unions may go this way or that, but it surely
does not follow that unions are irrelevant. The BCRA was cor-
rect to include them. As I will mention later, though, it becomes
difficult to evaluate the overall balance of advantages that
flows from the passage of the Act.
In similar fashion, the effort to neutralize corporate speech
cannot be avoided by the argument that speech is protected by
the First Amendment, but the use of money is not.41 Again, that
argument proves too much, as it would mean that anyone who
uses money to obtain assistance in preparing for political
37. Id.
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (creating safe harbors for labor unions and agricul-
tural organizations).
39. See 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (2006).
40. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
41. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that restrict-
ing political expenditures "necessarily includes the quantity of expression").
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speech has crossed over the line into potentially criminal con-
duct. That position makes no sense in light of ordinary interac-
tions between two or more people in which money changes
hands to purchase labor or goods for the creation or publica-
tion of speech. Indeed, I would say that any effort to cabin this
option by, for example, forbidding individuals to hire labor at
below minimum wage rates to distribute leaflets, should fall to
the First Amendment because such an effort abridges speech,
by blocking the necessary and proper means for its realization.
The same is true of any set of prohibitions against political
speakers, whether formally a part of the press or not, who help
promote the status of unions by encouraging them to strike to
shut down printing facilities.
In the earlier Lochner v. New Yorkl 2 era, the broader protection
of freedom of contract had as one of its collateral advantages
the additional protection that it afforded to freedom of speech
by precluding regulations that inhibited corporate speech, es-
pecially on political matters. Today, challenges of business
regulations that hamper political speech tend to fail because
they are dismissed by society as the pleadings of special busi-
ness interests. However, that failure is no reason to rejoice in
the current law. It is important to note that the rationale for this
exemption from constitutional scrutiny rests on the rather du-
bious line of cases "holding that generally applicable laws do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforce-
ment against the press has incidental effects on its ability to
gather and report the news."43 These incidental effects can be
deadly and therefore should be tested by the usual rules of
constitutionality developed in other areas. No one could excuse
murder on the ground that it was an incidental effect of a po-
litical protest. By extension, no system of regulation of corpo-
rate speech that devastates the ability of various parties to fund
the speech efforts of others can be excused on the ground that it
is just an incidental consequence of the general corporate law.
There should be a categorical rule here, but the appropriate
rule is exactly the opposite of those that are usually proposed.
42. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
43. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). For a more general cri-
tique of the incidental damage rule, see Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication,
and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 1003, 1024-27 (2000).
650 [Vol. 34
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The use of money is a necessary and proper part of any sensi-
ble speech activity, and should be protected as such.
IV. FUNCTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Thus far, each effort to find a conceptual way to undermine
the claim for corporate free speech runs into a constitutional
dead end. But the major issues are not these doctrinal matters.
Rather, the controversy stems from divergent assessments of
what the use of corporate speech-and now union speech-
will do to the political discourse of the nation. President
Obama strongly emphasized this point in his State of the Union
Address. 4 Professor Dworkin also stressed it repeatedly in his
article in the New York Review of Books,45 and it was the center-
piece of the Court's argument in both Austin and McConnell.
A. What is Corruption?
Much of this argument turns on the question of corruption,
or as the point was stated in Austin, the appearance of corrup-
tion.46 The second of these rationales seems to be dead on ar-
rival under any form of heightened scrutiny. The point of this
test is to make sure that government force is exercised only
against real dangers, not imagined ones. No one could suppress a
demonstration on the ground that it creates the appearance of un-
ruly or dangerous behavior. The usual test veers strongly in the
opposite direction, requiring some proof of a clear and imminent
danger before the state can use force to suppress these activities.47
The suspicion of government abuse and government overbreadth
looms large in this case, and it would be very dangerous to allow
any state to attack its critics in this particular fashion.
Some real evidence of corruption is needed in order to justify
any public suppression of corporate speech. In Austin, the sup-
posed villain was the distortion of the outcome in elections that
44. See President Barack H. Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), in
156 CONG. REC. H414-06 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010).
45. Ronald Dworkin, The "Devastating" Decision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at
65, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/feb/25/the-devastating-
decision/. For Professor Dworkin's more detailed discussion of the Citizens United
decision, see Dworkin, supra note 25.
46. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658 (1990).
47. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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followed from the use of corporate speech.4 But the term dis-
tortion presupposes that we have a clear sense of what the
proper baseline should be. Thus, in ordinary bribery cases, we
can count the number of voters who changed their votes be-
cause of bribes and use that as a possible basis to invalidate cer-
tain votes or an entire election. But in this context, there is no
baseline that serves a comparable function. The purpose of
speech is to switch sentiments by the presentation of new in-
formation, and it would be odd that any proof that the speech
was effective-such as when the outcome of some election
were altered-would be sufficient to show that the campaign
that spread the information was also corrupt. That task would
be daunting if multiple actors each expressed some sentiment
so that it became necessary to cancel each other out. That kind
of inquiry makes little or no sense. What is needed is some-
thing far more demanding, like finding instances of bona fide
corruption that are not already punishable under the complex
network of arrangements currently in place.
The astute critic would say that, in this instance, one should
look closely at such stalwarts as the Tillman Act,49 which pro-
hibits all contributions by corporations to candidates, and the
comparable legislation that does the same for unions.50 Indeed,
these statutes may be overbroad, but at least the direct contri-
bution raises a risk of quid pro quo corruption that should be
countered. In my view, that risk is what makes the Hatch Act,51
which forbids government employees from making campaign
contributions, such a wise statute: close proximity leads to arm-
twisting. Furthermore, the arms that are twisted are not those
of public officials, but of the corporation's own employees.
Consequently, the risk of a shakedown by an employer is great.
The Tillman Act's prohibition on corporate political donations
is a closer case because that the same risk is not present. And if
48. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660-61. For a relentless dissection of this decision, see
Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 121-26 (2010)
49. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)).
50. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
§ 304, § 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (superseded by Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendment of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112, § 321, 90 Stat. 475, 490 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006))).
51. Hatch Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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that is close, the argument in favor of the BCRA's electioneer-
ing communications ban seems to be far weaker. The balance
struck by the BCRA's ban looks to be wholly out of proportion
to the risk. Indeed, one striking feature of McConnell was the
paucity of evidence that Justices Stevens and O'Connor
amassed to show that corruption and improper conduct were
not caught by narrower rules. 52
B. The Limits of Corporate Influence on Public Policy
At this point, the argument shifts to what is, at long last, the
kernel of the dispute: the fear that corporations, with their im-
mense amounts of wealth, will so dominate the public stage
that the voices of ordinary citizens will be drowned out of the
body politic and our elections will be controlled by moneyed
interests that pay scant attention to the will of the nation as a
whole. As President Obama said in his State of the Union Ad-
dress: "I don't think American elections should be bankrolled
by America's most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign en-
tities." 53 There is an evident populist tinge to these arguments.
At the outset, I note that these arguments do not comport with
the account of corporations that I would give based on my
years of working on many controversial matters. All too often
corporations are highly reluctant to publicly fight indefensible
legislation or administrative action.
Instead of starting with some detailed empirical analysis, I
want to begin with anecdotes from my professional youth that
encapsulate what I believe to be the correct description of cor-
porate participation in public fora: corporations are likely to
follow prudentially pusillanimous policies. Years ago, when I
worked for the American Insurance Association (AIA) as a le-
gal consultant, I learned the true power of corporations when
we were regularly clobbered in our tort reform lobbying ef-
forts. I can recall one meeting where Assemblyman Jesse Un-
ruh, the great California legislator, looked at me and asked,
almost plaintively, "Professor Epstein, why should I support
any proposal that benefits out of state manufacturers at the ex-
pense of instate consumers?" Unruh clearly could count
votes-and disregard corporate charters.
52. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 95-96 (2003)
53. Obama, supra note 44, at H418.
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Then there was the time that I appeared in the Pennsylvania
legislature on a panel with Joe Doyle, head of the Pennsylvania
AFL-CIO, who began his testimony by noting that he repre-
sented 2,100,000 Pennsylvania union members and that his law-
yer would explain why the bill that I had helped draft was
unsound. No corporation testified in favor of the bill that day. I
replied that I represented folks from Aetna, Hartford, and other
insurance companies. Same result. No votes. I was far from im-
pressed with the corporate might that stood at my back.
On another occasion, I attended a meeting with members of
what was called the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
before the branded and generic companies parted ways. The
issue before the group was how to deal with FDA rulings on
beta blockers, which were in wide use in Europe but not in the
United States. The companies believed, with cause, I have been
told, that a few administrators in the FDA had thrown up un-
principled roadblocks to prevent their approval. As a relative
youngster, I had the answer: denounce the incompetent scien-
tists publicly, and the truth would win out. At that point, I re-
ceived a gentle rebuke from an industry lawyer who was both
older and wiser than me. He said that he liked my suggestion
in principle, but not in practice. We could denounce the official
and perhaps have him driven from office, but once that was
accomplished, the FDA would rally around its ousted member
in ways that would delay all sorts of other applications that the
company would have before the FDA on other products. Many
of these delays would look innocent, such as a request for fur-
ther studies. A company would be free, of course, to challenge
the delays in court as unjustified, but that would only delay
matters further. Thus, a small company with only one product
before the FDA might take on the agency, but the bigger corpo-
rations-the ones with all the market power-do not have the
luxury of that option because their multiple applications would
leave them vulnerable on too many fronts. Quiet diplomacy
with the FDA was the preferred alternative, a task for which I
have proved myself remarkably unsuitable. Nevertheless, it
was the inversion that stuck with me; big companies have
greater exposure to regulatory retaliation, and so less power to
challenge government action.
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C. The Pitfalls of Corporate Participation in Electoral Politics
It turns out that these anecdotes can be systematized. Politi-
cians respond to votes, not to causes. After my years working
with the AIA I met this fellow in the airport and asked him
what had become of my services as the AIA moved from New
York to Washington, D.C. His reply went something like this:
"When we hired you, we hired people for what they knew, and
we thought you knew a lot. Now we hire people for who they
know, and frankly you don't know anybody." The policymak-
ing effort was to lobby quietly, but not to win election cam-
paigns-a theme to which I will return later.
Yet, before that is done, it is worth posing some hard ques-
tions. Does an increase in size yield an increase in power over
Congress? Defenders of campaign finance usually claim that
dollars translate into power which translates into success. 54
However, the lessons from public choice theory are far from
cohesive on the issue. One key article on this point was writ-
ten in the Journal of Legal Studies over twenty years ago.55 My
friend Professor Fred McChesney noted that the usual story
that large concentrated firms can dictate public policy was too
simple by half.56 The problem, quite simply, was that in some
cases this concentrated power was a liability, not an asset.57 He
referred to the practice known as "milker bills," whereby
members of Congress propose new taxes or regulation on some
targeted industry unless it makes the requisite political contri-
butions to their cause.58
The game of influence is a two-way street, which exposes an
important set of corporate vulnerabilities: Size does not always
translate into power; making contributions to gain influence
can leave one exposed with few lines of defense; and, it is easy
to punish a corporate nonentity in the press because they are
hostage to their brands. It is easy to concoct anticorporate at-
tacks that play off the slogans that companies use to promote
54. See id. (stating that elections "should be decided by the American people"
not by corporate dollars).
55. Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
56. Id. at 109-12.
57. Id. at 110 ("Similarly, a large stock of specific (nonsalvageable) capital in-
creases the relative attraction to politicians of private rent extraction.").
58. Id. at 107-11.
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their brands. What airline do I refer to when I say "come die
with me?" What of the reworked slogans "things go worse
with Coke," or "buy IBM and crash in style"? Too easy.
The issue is clearer still when it is noted that corporations are
also subject to other constraints, both legal and practical, that
can easily dull their ardor to engage in political campaigning,
either for general causes or for particular candidates. Corporate
boards have fiduciary duties to their shareholders, and it is an
open question whether particular campaign contributions
could be a violation of their duties on the ground that they deal
with matters unrelated to the interests of the corporation. In
response, it could rightly be said that these contributions will
generally not provoke legal liability because of the extensive
discretion that is afforded to most corporate boards under the
business judgment rule. So far so good, but this rule does not
settle the dispute, because someone could allege that political
activities either are not germane to corporate business or are
subject to some per se rule of bad faith conduct.
The question of what issues are appropriate for corporate par-
ticipation can also be challenged in other ways. Dissident share-
holders and board members can force the firm to take up the
matter in some board meeting in ways that could distract the
firm from its ordinary business activities. Resolutions that deal
with proper public statements could be presented for considera-
tion in the press, even if there were no formal rights to have
these matters taken up directly. The heat on the board could be
powerful because the reputational constraints at play are ex-
tremely powerful. After all, the same corporation that pushes
many levers to get its detergents on supermarket shelves does
not have quite the same clout in political or information mar-
kets-it has the maneuverability of a beached whale.
Corporations invest heavily in brands, which is the way they
are held hostage to the public on matters of product quality.
The firm that does not defend the brand is the firm that cannot
survive in the marketplace. The general view of most brand
managers about any participation in politics, whether it relates
to elections or anything else is, by all means keep a low profile,
and by all means follow that distinguished cowardly path that
you have blazed in dealing with government action. The logic
is simple. Political statements will win a corporation many
enemies-enemies who can then boycott your products. The
same political statements may win you some friends, but not
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friends who will double their purchases just because you have
taken a stand they find favorable. Hence, the last thing that you
want to do as a corporation is get involved with election cam-
paigns when it is clear that no candidate embodies all the posi-
tions-and only those positions-that are ideal for the firm.
Entering this swamp presents a real danger, and no sensible
corporation should take that risky step.
Some important signals indicate that this is indeed the case.
Consider the long list of corporations that filed amicus curiae
briefs at some stage in Citizens United.59 Notice that among the
dozens of amici, the filer closest to representing the corporate
interest was the Chamber of Commerce, whose business is to
lobby for corporations. It makes no products that are subject to
market retaliation. And, in many cases, it is neutered. The
Chamber of Commerce often finds itself in the odd position of
having to take no stand on anything as its various members
fight it out in the political and judicial arena. Thus, business
versus business is a constant theme on such issues as net neu-
trality, where Verizon and Google duke it out; or in banking,
where the big banks, little banks, and retailers all have different
positions; or in drugs, where the branded companies and the
generic companies are often at loggerheads. It seems extremely
unlikely that corporations in these groups want to spend their
precious capital on elections that concern all sorts of issues
about which they hold no distinctive position. Instead, the cor-
porations want to spend their money where it matters to them:
on particular legislation where they hope to gain influence
while flying well below the radar.
And well they should. We also know that once these com-
panies do speak out on any public issue, the individuals who
are said to be unable to organize often drown the corporate
voices out. A few recent cases merit some general observa-
tions. Target announced a $150,000 gift to MN Forward, a pro-
business group which incidentally also has opposed gay mar-
riage and other issues.60 The response from MoveOn.org was
59. The full list of Supplemental Amicus Briefs can be found at Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/citizens-united-v-federal-election-commission/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
60. See Ira Boudway, Target's Off-Target Campaign Contribution, BUSINESS WEEK
(Aug. 5, 2010 5:00 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_33/
b4191032682244.htm.
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instantaneous and effective.61 Target went immediately into a
damage control mode, not knowing whether to demand a re-
fund of the grant or to ride out the storm.62 Its reputation as a
gay-friendly employer was put in jeopardy. There is little
doubt that it would have paid a hundred times as much as that
grant to make the story disappear. Target's political career
seems short.
The same seems true for Whole Foods, whose president, John
McKay, wrote a critique of the Obama health care plan, which I
regarded as mild and moderate, but which generated a fire-
storm of protest from progressive Whole Foods customers who
had rather different ideas.63 It turns out that the predictions of
corporate political strength just are not credible. The Internet
has changed all that, allowing cause-based groups to lash out
at corporate firms that do not toe the line. Even if such groups
offend folks on the other side of the political spectrum, it is no
matter because they do not survive on brand loyalty like com-
panies do. They operate with a fundamentally different dy-
namic from the corporation, where it is wise to lay low. Thus
the only question that they ask is whether they are in a position
to rally their own base, which they are.
There are ways for corporations to stay out of the political
spotlight. As a corporate board member, I would be proactive
and insulate the organization from general political contribu-
tions to keep from being blackmailed by political or activist
groups that would otherwise punish you for your silence in
election campaigns on a whole range of issues. That is what
Goldman Sachs did, because it knew just how vulnerable it was
to adverse publicity when it was sued last spring. The key
point in all these maneuvers rests on a relentless application of
the principle of comparative advantage. Corporations are natu-
rally concerned about issues that regulate their own industry.
To spend too much on general elections is to waste money on
issues not germane to the corporate welfare. It is better to look
at all issues individually, so that supporting or opposing par-
61. See Paul Schmelzer, MoveOn.org hits Target over gift to Emmer-backing PAC,
(Aug. 2, 2010, 2:25 PM) MINN. INDEP. http://minnesotaindependent.com/62515/
moveon-org-hits-target-over-gift-to-emmer-backing-pac.
62. See id.
63. See John Mackey, Opinion, The Whole Foods Alternative to ObamaCare, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 12, at A15.
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ticular candidates is not in the picture. It is no accident, there-
fore, that Citizens United, the corporation that brought this
suit, was in the political business and thus had none of the
brand name or other institutional constraints. No mainstream
company would touch this problem with a ten-foot pole.
The position of unions is really quite different on all these
metrics. Unions do not sell to general public audiences. They
can take powerful positions because they have only one objec-
tive: to win over the workers who can join their ranks. Thus,
they are not subject to the kind of popular backlash that exists
for ordinary corporations, which have to contend with broad-
spectrum markets. In addition, unions have a far higher stake
in what government does, because they represent over seven
million individuals who are also public employees.64 Further-
more, they represent these interests at a time when public un-
ion members outnumber (in absolute terms) union members in
private jobs, 65 and they do so at a time when public union pen-
sions are widely deplored as budget breakers.66
Citizens United, if it has an effect at all, is likely to favor labor
unions over mainstream corporations. Unions have something
to defend, making it more attractive for them to go after these
candidates. Note the recent example of unions working hard to
push Arkansas Senator Blanche Lincoln out of her seat67 for her
unwillingness to toe the line on the Employee Free Choice
Act.68 Union participation here was perhaps uniquely intense
because the balance of power in the Senate was so tenuous. But
the asymmetry of the stakes still matters in these circum-
stances. It is far more likely that unions will take up this privi-
lege than will corporations.
Much of this discussion depends on the types of disclosures
that are required. The BCRA contained various disclosure
provisions that survived Citizens United on the ground that
64. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union Mem-
bers-2010 (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
65. See id. (reporting 7.1 million private sector union members compared to 7.6
million public sector union members in 2010).
66. See, e.g., Clay Barbour & Mary Spicuzza, Walker Takes Broad Swipe at Public
Employee Unions, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 12, 2011, http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/
local/govt-and-politics/article_c814c77a-3600-le-b9e-001cc4c03286.html.
67. Shalia Dewan & Steven Greenhouse, Unions Make State in Arkansas Race, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2010, at A22.
68. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).
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they were antifraud provisions that let voters know who is
speaking. I have mixed emotions about these provisions be-
cause they also make it easier to retaliate against speakers,
which in turn could provoke counter-speech or, rather, even
uglier behaviors, such as the threats against AIG executives
attempting to enforce their contracts in the spring 2009 bail-
out.69 The question of personal threats is not off the table, but
it is not at all dominant. The effort to make CEOs sign all pub-
lic advertisements is clearly an effort both to intimidate and to
inform, in uncertain proportions. But because so few execu-
tives want to be caught in this quagmire, the intent to dis-
suade corporate speech through disclosure requirements was
successful. Regardless, there will be questions of whether only
CEOs should be subject to this level of public opprobrium.
Personally, I take greater offense at the efforts to exclude for-
eign corporations from speaking about domestic elections.
Their stake in our laws on trade issues is often great, and
blocking these views in an effort to promote some kind of jin-
goist balance is the worst possible policy, and probably un-
constitutional as well.
CONCLUSION
In sum, there is much heat on this discussion and little light.
The key issue is to define the determinants of speech level.
Writing on this issue after McConnell, I took the position that
the key determinant of the level of political activity is the size
of the stakes in various campaigns, whether for elections or for
particular bills. Those stakes are enormous, and they are even
greater now than before because there is so much new legisla-
tion on the table, which promises to shake up matters. On these
issues, the weak constitutional protections against various
forms of activity mean that there are many issues on the politi-
cal field left to fight out. Banning the corporation will cause
other groups to take up the cudgels. It is ironic that the Tea
Party has grown so mightily and is now a force to be reckoned
with, even though it has none of the corporate, or even central-
ized, elements that the dissenters feared. Indeed, it tends to be
69. Andrew Pergam, Threats to AIG: "We Will Get Your Children,
NBCCONNECICUT.COM (March 26, 2009, 10:44 AM), http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/
news/local/AIG-Threats-We-will-get-your-children.html.
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opposed to both parties and to large corporations that seek
their favor. Their positions are explosive and uncertain, but
these small groups are where the action is. It is at this level that
we shall see the battle, for the progressive groups will mobilize
heavily as well. In the end, it is the citizens that will drown out
the corporations, as if they wanted to speak, which they do not.
Hysterical predictions of transformation are heavily over-
blown. It will be politics as usual, which is not to say that it will
be politics as it should be.
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